Archive for the ‘Lawyer stuff’ Category

Obama continues Bush’s assault on the law

Wednesday, September 8th, 2010

The Constitution really is on life support.

Citing the Obama administration’s evocation of the state secrets privilege, a divided federal appeals court agreed Wednesday to toss a lawsuit against a Boeing subsidiary accused of helping the CIA transport detainees to secret foreign prisons where they allegedly were tortured.

Ruling 6-5, a panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said it was bound by a 1953 Supreme Court precedent requiring judges to dismiss cases if litigating them could expose government secrets and imperil national security.

“This case requires us to address the difficult balance the state secrets doctrine strikes between fundamental principles of our liberty, including justice, transparency, accountability and national security,” Judge Raymond Fisher wrote for the majority. “Although as judges we strive to honor all of these principles, there are times when exceptional circumstances create an irreconcilable conflict between them.

“On those rare occasions, we are bound to follow the Supreme Court’s admonition that ‘even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that [state] secrets are at stake,’” Fisher continued.

The honorable judge doth protest too much, methinks. In fact, the States Secret Privilege was first adopted in a case in which the United States government committed a blatant fraud on the court, and it has been successfully employed for just that purpose ever since. It may be a “rare” case in which it is raised, but it is an even rarer case where, once raised, the claim is seriously examined. It’s hard to believe that any judge really believes that there are state secrets involved in these cases; the privilege is raised for the purpose of avoiding responsibility and publicity. As in the case above, the government’s real motivations are always painfully obvious.

It’s truly depressing that the Obama administration has utilized these doctrines, though I suppose one could argue that Justice Department lawyers are only taking advantage of a legal principle that a misguided Supreme Court established. It is expecting too much, I suppose, to hope that Obama would break the mold, take the long view, and attempt to preserve a republican form of government.

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Yet another suspect conviction

Sunday, June 27th, 2010

The Boston Globe casts doubt on an arson conviction of a man who has now been in prison since the mid 80s. It’s a familiar story-the primary evidence against him was a confession obtained after hours of police questioning. The details of the confession were are variance with the physical evidence at the scene, but who’s going to sweat the details when you have a confession?

We will never know what led up to his decision to put pen to paper. Is the interpreter’s (the convicted man was Hispanic) story true:

The translator who assisted in the police interrogation has made a dramatic reversal of the account he gave at trial. In a sworn affidavit provided to Rosario’s current attorneys, he says Rosario was delusional during the questioning and did not understand what he was signing.

It is a continuing mystery. Why do we allow a confession into evidence if the police do not also produce a complete videotape of the interrogation? It’s not like the technology is expensive or difficult to operate. If the police can’t handle it, they can hire high school kids, who could use the extra money.

Of course it’s not really a mystery at all. The police don’t want to do it, because it would deprive them of the ability to get quick and easy confessions, actual guilt or innocence be damned. The judges don’t want to require them to do it, and ditto with the state legislatures of the various states. Of course the police will maintain there is absolutely nothing untoward going on in the interrogations, and, absent overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the courts will profess to believe them.

In this case, at least according to the Globe, there was probably no crime at all. The fire in question was probably accidental. But the man convicted by his own confession has now been in prison more than half his life, and the chances are, at best, about even that he will get the new trial he is requesting.

In any sane world we would have an exclusionary rule: no video, no evidence.


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Bysiewicz decision

Tuesday, May 18th, 2010

Susan got beat badly. It’s a shame that this happened to her. From any point of view she’s qualified both intellectually and professionally to be Attorney General, but as I’ve said before, the legal questions were serious. Since the court ruled against her, it stands to reason that the court rejected both her claims-that she was engaged in the active practice of law, and that the “active practice” requirement was unconstitutional. On the latter issue, it will be interesting to see if the court’s reasoning, which we won’t know until later, tracks the reasoning that Blumenthal’s office used in coming to the same result.


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I’m just a country lawyer, but…

Friday, April 16th, 2010

Why is this not conspiracy to defraud?

Goldman Sachs has been accused of fraud by the SEC, but its apparent partner in fraud will emerge far richer and unscathed.

… Paulson & Co., made a $3.7 billion profit by betting against the housing market as it nose dived in 2006 and 2007. On Friday, the Securities and Exchange Commission disclosed that $1 billion of those profits came in an insider deal in which Goldman Sachs allegedly let the company select subprime securities for a complicated offshore deal and then bet on their failure.

So, Paulson fully expected the securities it chose to tank. It also fully expected that Goldman would be selling those securities to suckers around the world, and it must have known, should have known, surely knew, that Goldman would not be telling those investors that the securities were expected to fail.

If I enter into an agreement that requires the other party to defraud others-that cannot succeed unless others are defrauded- why am I not as liable as the person who actively defrauds? I personally wouldn’t think twice about suing both parties if I had an analogous situation come my way. And yet, according to the SEC:

SEC officials said Friday that Paulson was not charged in the Goldman case because the company did not mislead investors.

No, it simply entered into an agreement that could not succeed unless someone else misled investors. Someone who had explicitly or implicitly promised to do just that.

Perhaps this is some sort of arcane jurisdictional issue at the SEC. Perhaps it only has jurisdiction over individuals that actually and actively make representations to investors. If so, then one can only hope this loophole would be addressed in the financial reform package.


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For the record

Tuesday, March 23rd, 2010

Several publicity hungry attorneys general have filed suit to have the Health Care bill, or portions thereof, declared unconstitutional. They are using the same overheated rhetoric that the Republican Congresspersons and Senators used. To us sane people, particularly us sane lawyers, the idea that this mild mannered health care bill is an “unprecedented expansion of government power” is bewildering. 14th Amendment anyone? Presidential war-making powers? Any of a hundred other examples?

That being said, I have to say that the prospect of success for this lawsuit is fairly good, considering that, if one simply looks at the state of the law today, it totally lacks merit. We no longer live in a country where the judicial system conforms to certain norms. That period in our history ended with Bush v. Gore. It only takes 5 votes to overturn this law, or gut it, and it can be done for the most specious of reasons, no doubt dressed up in language that would lead the ignorant to believe that the result was absolutely compelled by prior case law. There is no reason to think the present court will hesitate to do what it needs to do. Note also that the attorneys general had the ability to forum shop, to file in a district where they will likely get a sympathetic judge, in a circuit where they will get a sympathetic Circuit Court, so that the Supreme Court might be able to strike down portions of the bill while making itself look moderate by narrowing the lower court decisions.

Personally, unless one of the five drops dead soon (tis a consummation …) I give the attorneys general a 50/50 chance of winning. I am writing this now just to be able to say you heard it here first, should it come to pass. I hope I’m wrong, but the fact is that we currently have a lawless court. If they don’t like this bill, and decide they must deliver for their base (Justice Thomas wife just started a group designed to siphon money from the tea party yokels by whipping up their fear and anger), they will find their way clear to sweeping away more than a century of jurisprudence.


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The corporate court strikes again

Monday, March 15th, 2010

It is a sad fact that those things to which we pay the most attention often have the least significance. A case in point is Eric Massa, who will not even rate a footnote in history. At the same time, truly significant developments often go unnoticed. It’s only years later that we realize something has changed, brought about by something that went virtually unnoticed at the time.

This is a case in point, reported by the American Prospect. Back in 2003 Javaid Iqbal, a Pakistani immigrant, was jailed in New York and tortured, before being deported. There is no evidence that he had ever done anything wrong.

The following year, he filed a lawsuit against dozens of U.S. officials, claiming he was declared a “high interest” detainee and placed in ADMAX because of his race, religion, and national origin. Iqbal’s lawyers sought to question former Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller under oath about their responsibility for the jailing and abuse of detainees in the Brooklyn detention center. But by a 5-4 vote last May, the Supreme Court’s conservative majority rejected the request, quashing a lawsuit that had spent five years climbing through the lower courts. The justices ruled that Iqbal’s lawyers had not made a plausible case that Ashcroft or Mueller was responsible for Iqbal’s mistreatment and barred the lawyers from asking the government to turn over evidence to which only it had access. In doing so, the court used Ashcroft v. Iqbal to rewrite more than a half-century of precedent establishing the hurdles plaintiffs must cross before they can begin discovery — the pre-trial process that requires defendants to hand over internal documents, answer questions under oath, and provide other evidence.

The opinion was so broad that it has become a formidable weapon for corporations and other defendants trying to shield themselves against everything from employment discrimination to product-liability lawsuits. Since the ruling, dozens of cases that might have once proceeded have been thrown out because they don’t meet the Iqbal test.

When John Roberts, and Alito were nominated, attention was focused on their views on so-called social issues, such as abortion, but perceptive observers knew that their real agenda was corporatist. They haven’t touched the abortion decision, and probably don’t care if they do, but they have done yeoman’s work for the corporations to whom they have always given their primary allegiance.

The fact is that it is often the case that we know beyond a moral doubt that something is happening when we lack the legal evidence to prove it. Employment discrimination cases are a great example. If white folks, or men, seem to be getting all the promotions, you might know deep in your gut that something is wrong, but you have to prove it with raw data, and that’s where the discovery process comes in. If you have to prove your case before you start discovery, then many cases will never be commenced. Heretofore, you could commence discovery as long as you alleged facts that stated a cause of action (which the Prospect calls the pleading standard, a term I’ve never heard, though it’s accurate enough); now you have to produce hard evidence in support of the common sense inferences that flow from known facts. It’s those inferences you need discovery to prove, but now you don’t get discovery unless you can prove it to begin with. If, for instance, the New York Times, citing unnamed sources, disclosed that a certain corporation was poisoning your water, you might not be able to sue unless you could name those sources. The Prospect cites just such a case.

The Prospect notes:

Indeed, legal scholars will long debate whether the Roberts court seized on the Iqbal case to change the pleading standard or whether it changed the pleading standard incidentally, in its eagerness to throw out the Iqbal case and protect senior national-security officials from questioning.

I don’t think there’s much debate here. It was a perfect opportunity to make such a ruling, because its real impact would get lost in the smoke that alway surrounds the word “terrorism”. Congress is already bought and paid for, with even worse to come as we enter the era of corporate sponsorship of politicians. Now the courts are being slowly closed to the average citizen, not by direct legislation, but by arcane interpretations of the legal ground rules by which we adjudicate legal disputes.

Meanwhile, the Obama Administration, eschewing the idea that it might be able to do two things at once, has done almost nothing to get its judicial nominees approved, practically guaranteeing right wing judicial dominance into the foreseeable future.


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More on Bysiewicz’s woes

Monday, February 8th, 2010

At the risk of beating a decomposing horse, I want to reply to a comment I received on my post about Susan Bysiwicz’s legal problems. Here it is, the first paragraph being a quote from my post:

Blumenthal responds that the amendment that made the AG a constitutional officer was enacted against the backdrop of the very statute that Susan would like to invalidate. We assume that a legislature acts with knowledge of pre-existing law, and there is no reason to believe that the legislature intended to repeal the quite reasonable requirement that the Attorney General be an attorney.

But the Legislature did not write the relevant provision (Art. 6, Sec. 10):

Every elector shall be eligible to any office in the state, except in cases provided for in this constitution.

That wasn’t written by the Legislature, but by the Constitutional Convention. The amendment that established the AG as a Constitutional Officer (Amendment I, 1969) was written by the Legislature, but they did not see fit to provide additional qualifications in their amendment. (The offices of Governor, Lt. Governor, State Rep, and State Senator all have additional qualifications.)

This is really just a restatement of the argument that the statute is unconstitutional because it imposes a requirement that the constitution does not. I actually dealt with this in my original post, but some additional discussion might be appropriate.

First, I don’t disagree with the commenter’s factual statements. This is just another way of saying that the legislative enactment (the 10 year active practice requirement) preceded the creation of the constitutional office. One could argue that the constitutional change implicitly repealed every statute on the books regarding the attorney general. It is not an irrational argument, but it would be irrational to argue that the legislature intended to do that. No one could argue with a straight face that the legislature intended to open up the AG’s job to a high school graduate with no legal training. Parenthetically, the fact that the statute came first probably weakens Bysiewicz’s case. Had the legislature tried to add qualifications by statute after the enactment of the constitutional provision, her argument would be much stronger.

It is not impossible that a judge would rule that, while the legislature clearly intended for the experience requirement to stay in place, that it blew it, and created a situation that permits any 18 year old elector to be attorney general. That is not impossible. And given that our legislature is not the United States Senate, it’s probably an oversight that the legislature would swiftly correct. A judge might reasonably anticipate just that response, and feel that s/he could safely rule the statute unconstitutional on the theory that the problem would be fixed before any harm could be done. After all, right now the only person affected is Susan, and at least all of us on this side of the political fence can probably agree that she is actually, as opposed to legally, qualified for the job. That is the argument that will have to prevail in court, and it is the argument the commenter is implicitly making.

Count me unconvinced. I wouldn’t bet my life savings, but if I had to put a dollar on either side, I’d bet that Blumenthal’s argument wins. Which gets us back to my final conclusion, which I’ll reiterate. As a person who wants to see a Democrat win, I’ll be backing one of the other candidates. Why buy into trouble?

By the way, it is possible that any group or individual voter, even a group of Democrats, could bring suit once Susan certifies herself as a candidate. I don’t know if individual voters would have standing, but it seems possible that anyone could bring an action seeking a declaratory judgment that Susan was ineligible. In that case, Blumenthal’s office would presumably come in to represent the state, which might be awkward, but Susan would need to get counsel of her own. Or, she could represent herself, and get in some active practice.


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Bysewicz in trouble

Sunday, February 7th, 2010

Susan Bysiewicz is in a bit of trouble. She withdrew from her exploratory gubernatorial campaign, and announced her candidacy for attorney general. Turns out, however, that there is a more than reasonable legal argument that she is not qualified for the job.

Here are the facts: Susan practiced law for about six years before entering politics. She may or may not have checked a box on her occupational tax form to the effect that she was not practicing law during her political period, but I’ve become somewhat convinced that, while that might prove politically embarrassing, should she continue in her quest, it is probably not a total legal impediment, though it may be evidence against her. After she announced, a Connecticut blogger (and I’m not sure who) brought up the provisions of Section 3-124 of the Connecticut General Statutes, which reads, in part:

The Attorney General shall be an elector of this state and an attorney at law of at least ten years’ active practice at the bar of this state.

After the issue was raised, Susan (I’m going to use her first name, since I can consistently spell it right) asked Dick Blumenthal for his opinion. She had a colorable reason to ask him for the ruling, because as secretary of state she is required to certify candidates. Blumenthal sort of refused to bite, ultimately kicking the can to the courts. At least that’s the way it’s been played in the media, but my own reading of his decision leads me to believe that Susan is in serious trouble.

First, a little history. At the present time the Attorney General is a constitutional officer. It has not always been thus. Prior to 1970 the AG’s office was a creature of statute. The Constitution was amended in 1970, merely adding the AG to the list of officers elected every four years, but the statutory system that had created the job remained on the books. Among those statutes was the statute that includes the 10 year active practice provision.

There is a separate provision in the Constitution that provides that:

Every elector who has attained the age of eighteen years shall be eligible to any office in the state.

So Susan has two arguments. First, she argues that the provisions of the Constitution, conferring eligibility on anyone over 18, trump the statutory provisions and render them unconstitutional. In other words, if the Constitution says anyone can hold any office, the legislature can’t arbitrarily, or even non-arbitrarily, restrict eligibility for any office beyond the age requirement in the Constitution. Her second argument is that the active practice of law consists of basically being a licensed lawyer, and that therefore any lawyer with 10 years of bar membership is eligible. Her third argument is that the Secretary of State is engaged in the active practice of law.

It was only as to the third argument that Blumenthal kicked the can to the courts. He ruled against Susan on the other two.

To a very concrete thinker, the first argument should have a certain superficial appeal. The argument goes like this. The constitution is the supreme law. The Constitution does not require active bar membership, and its language is rather emphatic (Every elector…shall be eligible to any office”). The statute in question adds an additional requirement that, as a practical matter, no 18 years old can ever meet. So in addition to imposing an experience requirement, it abolishes the age requirement.

Blumenthal responds that the amendment that made the AG a constitutional officer was enacted against the backdrop of the very statute that Susan would like to invalidate. We assume that a legislature acts with knowledge of pre-existing law, and there is no reason to believe that the legislature intended to repeal the quite reasonable requirement that the Attorney General be an attorney. Not only does that seem unreasonable, but if the legislators had so intended, they would have repealed the statute explicitly. He concludes, I think correctly, that a court would hold the statutory requirement constitutional.

It goes downhill from there for Susan. Blumenthal demolishes the argument that merely being an attorney is the same as actively being an attorney. To state it that way pretty much refutes it. If the legislature intended to make any attorney whose license was more than 10 year old eligible for the office, it could have done so quite easily. A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that each word in a statute is presumed to have meaning, and there’s every reason to believe that the legislature intended this word to have meaning. The legislature obviously wanted the chief civil attorney in the state to have some experience. That’s totally rational, and unlikely to raise judicial hackles.

So, at least in my opinion, Susan must argue that, as Secretary of State, she is engaged in the active practice of law. The fact, if fact it is, that she ticked off the “not actively practicing” box on her occupational tax form may cause her PR problems down the road. I don’t think that dooms her case in the abstract. She could have been wrong when she ticked that box, so she may be responsible for back taxes and maybe for making a false statement, though I think the latter is a stretch. In any event, it would certainly be admissible as evidence of her own understanding of the duties of her office. (I should state again that I am not 100% sure how she completed this form; I am relying on double and triple hearsay).

My own opinion is that had she so stated on that form, it would have been a true statement. While legal training might be very helpful for a secretary of state, it is neither a prerequisite for the job, nor does the job involve the practice of law. If it did, then most of our secretaries of state have been engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, which is illegal. On the other hand, the case law cited by the attorney general, at least some of it, implies or states that a law professor who merely teaches the law is engaged in active practice. One does not even need to be admitted to the bar to teach in a law school. Heck, you don’t even, strictly speaking, need a law degree. So I suppose Susan could argue that engaging in a line of work in which one is regularly called on to use one’s legal training is sufficient to satisfy the statute. My own opinion is that the argument proves too much; anyone with a law degree could argue that their training comes in handy in almost any professional or business related job. The result would be to render the “active” in “active practice” somewhat meaningless.

All that being said, lets be generous and give Susan a 50% chance of winning in court. What does the potential delegate to the convention, or Democratic primary voter who wants to win, make of all this? Susan would probably be a perfectly good attorney general. This issue aside, she is probably the most electable of the three announced candidates. For myself, based on what I know at the moment, and if I were a judge, I would rule her ineligible for the office. Nominating her, and/or electing her, is, in my opinion, asking for trouble. I don’t know what the courts do when they declare an elected candidate ineligible for the office to which they were elected. I seem to recall Joe Biden was actually a few days short of 30 when he was first elected to the Senate, but somehow the problem went away. It’s a problem in which I, personally, would prefer not to invest, nor do I want to find out that the answer is that the runner up gets the office. Right now Susan is taking the position that she’ll forge ahead, until someone sues her. That means the Republicans can bide their time, and sue at the most opportune time for them, unless one of the Democrats sues her first, which might be off the table, for political reasons. Personally, until this is cleared up, I’m supporting anyone but Bysiewicz. It’s more important that we win, than that she wins.


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Capuano moves to muzzle the corporations

Saturday, January 30th, 2010

An intrepid young reporter at the Boston Globe (who shall go unnamed, but whose last name rhymes, and more, with mine) informs us that US Representative Michael E. Capuano (who in retrospect should have been nominated for the Senate) has come up with a nifty way to all but nullify the recent court ruling handing the country over to the corporations. Taking his cue from the court’s “logic” that a corporation is merely an association of individuals, who therefore have a collective right to speak, he would require the corporation to get the consent of those individuals before it could do any speaking.

US Representative Michael E. Capuano is proposing to limit the impact of a Supreme Court decision on campaign financing by requiring companies to seek shareholder approval for most political donations.

“The money belongs to the shareholders,’’ said Capuano, a Somerville Democrat. “Let them make that decision.’’

The court’s ruling last week struck down decades-old restrictions on corporate money in politics, sparking outrage among advocates for tighter campaign finance rules and a rare rebuke of the court from President Obama during his State of the Union address. Capuano’s legislation would make it more difficult for companies to greatly expand their political activity.

The legislation would apply to any corporate donation of more than $10,000. Executives would have to convene a shareholder vote to get permission to spend such money for any political purposes. It would also require companies to report such expenditures quarterly to shareholders.

The devil is in the details in these things. The legislation must be crafted to prevent the possibility of a shareholder resolution giving the directors prospective carte blanche to spend money as they see fit. It has to require them to get authority for each and every proposed expenditure greater than $10,000.00, otherwise it is mere window dressing and a sham.

It will be interesting to see how the court would go about finding that sort of requirement unconstitutional, something it will surely want to do. Corporations are creatures of statute, and, at least up to now, the way in which they are organized and run internally are subject to statutory regulation. They are supposed to be run for the benefit of the shareholders, but to paraphrase John Yoo, that view has become somewhat quaint, given the way the profits are distributed these days. Still, in theory, a corporation is an association of stockholders, not CEOs, so it’s going to take all the originalist legal thinking Roberts can muster for him to unshackle his friends from the law Capuano is proposing.


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I hate to admit it, but

Tuesday, October 20th, 2009

I was only a bit surprised to see that the Obama Defense Department opposed Al Franken’s amendment to forbid government contractors from forcing the victims of sexual assault into arbitration, which is the equivalent of guaranteeing them no redress. The Obama Administration has been better than Bush on civil liberties, but it’s hard to imagine anyone being worse. Here’s the Defense Department’s rationale:

“The Department of Defense, the prime contractor, and higher tier subcontractors may not be in a position to know about such things. Enforcement would be problematic, especially in cases where privity of contract does not exist between parties within the supply chain that supports a contract,” reads the DoD note. “It may be more effective to seek a statutory prohibition of all such arrangements in any business transaction entered into within the jurisdiction of the United States, if these arrangements are deemed to pose an unacceptable method of recourse.”

Hate to say it, but this actually makes sense. Here’s the text of Franken’s Amendment:

Sec. 8104. (a) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be used for any existing or new Federal contract if the contractor or a subcontractor at any tier requires that an employee or independent contractor, as a condition of employment, sign a contract that mandates that the employee or independent contractor performing work under the contract or subcontract resolve through arbitration any claim under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or any tort related to or arising out of sexual assault or harassment, including assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, or negligent hiring, supervision, or retention.

It does seem that enforcement would be a problem. DOD would be required to inquire into each contractor, and each subcontractor, right down the line. Any subcontractor who violated would trigger non-payment for everyone concerned. It’s a cumbersome way to achieve Franken’s goal.

Maybe the reason it was worded this way was to make it a budget amendment, and thus not subject to filibuster; but that hardly seems likely, since it got 70 votes. Doubtless there’s some arcane reason why Franken chose this approach.

The obvious approach would simply have been to make any such agreement to arbitrate unenforceable if the employee involved was working on any covered government contract. That would make enforcement easy, because it would be unnecessary. All the employee would have to do is prove to the court that he or she was working on a covered contract, and the arbitration clause would bite the dust. (A better approach, but don’t expect it to every happen, would have been to outlaw employee arbitration agreements completely, since they are classic contracts of adhesion.) That appears to be what DOD is suggesting, and I think they’re right.


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